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N 1809 when Coleridge was prompted to write about his time in Malta by the 
death of Sir Alexander Ball, the late Civil Commissioner whom he so much 
admired, he recorded that he regarded his stay on the Island as “in many respects 
the most memorable and instructive period of my life”.2  As those familiar with 
Coleridge’s history recall, Coleridge had arrived on Malta in May 1804 
predominantly to liberate himself from opium dependency.   
 Coleridge impressed Ball, whom he met shortly after his arrival.  Coleridge 
originally replaced Edmond Chapman as under-secretary3 during the latter’s 
absence from Malta on the speculative corn mission, about which more will be 
said below.  However, following the death of the Public Secretary and Treasurer, 
Alexander Macaulay, on 18th January 1805, Coleridge was appointed as a 
temporary replacement pending Chapman’s return to the Island, although he 
declined to act as Treasurer.  In contrast to his role as under-secretary, the Public 
Secretaryship  contained formal responsibilities and in taking on the position he 
assumed a post second in civil dignity to that of the Civil Commissioner. He thus 
found himself at the heart of government.   
 The purpose of this article is to outline the legal, political, administrative and 
economic challenges encountered by the British administration in the period 
1800-1809 in which Coleridge had assumed an important role, as well as to 
venture some comments about the coherence of British policy.  Some limited 
observations on Coleridge’s contribution to the success of British rule at this 
time will also be advanced.    
 
I 
Preliminary remarks 
Between 1530 and the French invasion of Malta in 1798 the Island had been in 
the possession of the Knights Hospitaller of the Order of St John.  The Knights 
were a lay and ecclesiastical élite, drawn from all the countries of Europe, who 
pursued a charitable and military mission on Malta.4  As a regional power they 
had provided a buttress against the westward Ottoman expansion.  Within Malta 
the Knights pursued charitable and paternalist polices ostensibly for the benefit 
of the Maltese people.  Coleridge, of course, held a highly unfavourable view of 
the Order whom he regarded as degenerate—its members tainted by moral laxity 
and corruption. 
 A complex administration had been developed under the Order.  This was  
____
1  This article is derived from a project funded by a small grant of the British Academy. A monograph entitled, Coleridge’s 
Laws: a Study of Coleridge in Malta, is planned.  
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
2  S.T.Coleridge, The Friend I (1818) Collected Works ed B. Rooke, Princeton, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969, p. 533. 
3   To William Sotheby, Letters II 1142.  In this letter Coleridge mistakenly referred to himself as Ball’s private secretary. 
4  There had been little assimilation of the knights as rulers into Maltese society.  As a celibate order assimilation by 
marriage was obviously precluded.  The Order had also refused to share power with the Maltese and were perceived as 
despotic arrogant and elitist.) In this essence the Maltese had a bifurcated society.  The knights were, by 1798, widely 
seen as degenerate and immoral: see Hardman, W A History of Malta during the Period of French and British Occupation 
1798-1815 (edited by J Holland Rose) London: Longmans, Green & Co.  1909, Ch 1, and Coleridge, The Friend see n.1, 
p.  536. 
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responsible for the funding and maintaining the defence of the Island, as well as 
other governmental activities such as maintaining a system of courts for the 
redress of disputes, minting the coinage, operating a police force, running 
hospitals, establishing and maintaining a water supply,5 operating customs duties 
and the bulk purchase and supply of grain and other foodstuffs by means of the 
Università of Valletta, a municipal corporation upon which the British were to 
place a significant reliance.6  The Order also pursued welfare polices for the 
benefit of the Maltese, including welfare support for the poor and a system of 
medical care, which meant that health care was available to all. 
 The costly policies and institutions fostered as part of the Order’s 
paternalist polices had been funded from revenue arising from various sources, 
including customs duties, the profits the Order derived from commissioning 
privateers, rents from property on Malta owned by the Order and, above all, 
revenues from the Knights’ European estates.  This latter source of revenue had 
been lost after the French Convention abolished the Order in France and 
confiscated its assets in 1792.7  From the point of view of both the inhabitants 
and the Order the confiscation had been calamitous.  It reduced the revenue of 
the Island by three–quarters.8  Its immediate effect for the economic and social 
system of the Order meant that the Island’s finances were plunged into a grave 
and irredeemable deficit.9  
 But the system of providing subsidised grain had also run into deficit.  The 
Order possessed a monopoly over the supply of grain.  The purpose of the 
system was that the State controlled the price at which grain was retailed so as to 
ensure that plentiful and affordable grain was available to the Maltese 
population.  This was a particular advantage to the poor during times of regional 
shortage (eg 1799-1806) when the international market price was high.   
 This monopoly system was predicated on achieving a long-term balanced 
budget.  The price at which grain was sold might be above the purchase price, in 
which case the Università enjoyed a surplus for the year, or sold at less than cost 
price in which case the monopoly would be “trading” at a loss drawing on any 
surpluses that might have accrued in earlier years.  The sales at a loss were, as we 
have seen, thought to be necessary to shield the Maltese from inflation in the 
price of staple foodstuffs.10  But there was political capital to be gained as well, 
since price stability and ample staple food gained popularity for the autocratic 
regime of the Knights. 
 The Grandmasters of the Order had, however, subsidised grain so heavily 
____
5  Water was scarce.  Aqueducts were used to pipe water into Valletta .  Parts of the system can still be seen. 
6  Pirotta, G.  A., The Maltese Public Service 1800-1940 Msida: Mireva, 1996, p.10, citing Ryan, F.  W.  The House of the Temple 
London: Burns and Oates, 1930, p.  103. 
7  It has been estimated that the Knights spent in Malta circa £180,000 p.a.  from their overseas revenues: see Bartolo, P, 
British Colonial Budgeting in Malta: the first formative Decades 1800-1838 Melita Historica 8 (1980) 1, at p.  7.   
8  See Hardman, above n.4 at p.  548.  The immediate loss of revenue as a result of the actions of the French Republic 
was about £50,000 per annum.  In 1788 the Island’s revenue was £136,417, but by 1798 this was reported to have 
declined to a mere £34,663 14s 2d.  See also the Report prepared by Captain Alexander Ball (as he then was) for 
Dundas on 26th December 1800, Public Record Office, Kew CO 158/1/17-47, 20; Hardman, loc.  cit.  Appendix II. 
9  In 1796 this deficit was £34, 249, see Hardman loc.  cit.  p. 548. 
10  See Report by Ball to Dundas on Malta, 26th December 1800, above n. 8.  
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since about 1740 that the Università was insolvent before the French invasion.11  
Thornton, the careful and authoritative official who became Auditor-General in 
Malta under the British, reported in 1816 that the deficit by the time of the 
French invasion was in excess of one million scudi (£100,000).12 
 During th
welfare policies threatened political instability.  The Order became desperate to 
secure the fragile foundation of its government by negotiating to place itself 
under the protection of Russia.  The French, who disapproved of this 
development, had responded by invasion in 1798. 
 The French occupation was soon disliked.  S
looted the capital of the Island, most notably the assets of the Island’s Treasury, 
the Public bank (the Università) and the Monte di Pietà (a publicly owned pawn 
broking and lending institution) as well as the assets of religious foundations.  
The consequences of this looting became especially significant when the British 
required funds for reconstruction.13  
 The abuses perpetrated by the French resulted in a
Maltese following Nelson’s defeat of the French navy in August 1798 at the 
Battle of Aboukir Bay.  British and other forces subsequently aided the Maltese 
in their liberation struggle.  After two years of siege and blockade the French 
garrison in Valletta surrendered to the British military.  Much to their chagrin, 
the Maltese were excluded from the negotiations for the capitulation: Britain had 
resolved upon an exclusive right to control the affairs of the Island.  The 
exclusion of the Maltese, and the failure to heed the representations that they 
might well have made, was to have lasting consequences. 
 Alexander Ball, a naval officer under Nelson’s comm
appointed as “Civil Governor” of the Island during the siege, was highly popular 
with the Maltese.  They looked to him to continue a civil administration, which 
he did for a brief period after the surrender.  Notwithstanding this he was 
ordered to return to his ship in February 1801.  After a brief, unpopular, military 
government under Major-General Pigot, Charles Cameron was appointed the 
first British Civil Commissioner in May 1801.  However, Ball, who was asked to 
return to administer the Island and oversee the implementation of the Treaty of 
Amiens, took office to begin his second administration in July 1802.14  This 
lasted until his death in service in 1809. 
 
The E
 
____
11  See generally account of the Royal Commission of 1812, Public Record Office, Kew CO 158/19/161-183, 167-169, 
and the Report to His Excellency the Governor on the Accounts of the University of Valletta from 4th September 1800-31st December 
1814” by W Thornton dated 12th July 1816 Public Record Office, Kew CO 163/33/1, 1816. 
12  Thornton above n.11 and Bartolo, P, British Colonial Budgeting in Malta: the first formative Decades 1800-1838, above n.  7, 
who comments on the reliability of Thornton’s data. 
13  Eight thousand Maltese citizens, few of whom returned, were sent by the French to fight in Egypt: Macaulay to Ball 
25th January 1804, Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/10/119. 
14 Public Record Office, Kew, CO 159/3/85. 
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The Depression 18
T
and 1800 had interrupted 
reconstruction was a major problem that the new British administration had to 
address.  Valletta, wrote Ball, was as if storm-swept: many houses had either 
been destroyed or damaged; the shops had been plundered and emptied of 
stock, and the inhabitants “reduced to misery”;16 indeed they were close to 
starvation.  Coleridge described how the ensuing economic depression was so 
severe that large numbers of the poor could only survive by begging on the 
streets.  Many would congregate along a thoroughfare in Valletta that earned the 
name of the “Nix Mangiare Stairs”, named after the cry of the supplicants who 
had nothing to eat.17 
 The blockade had forced the occupying French forces to seize Maltese ships 
in the harbour and break them up for firewood, thus crippling the merchant 
capacity of the Island.  This destruction also created a more pressing problem.  
The lack of grain in Valletta at the time of the surrender, combined with the lack 
of Maltese vessels in which to import supplies compelled Ball to rely on foreign 
owned vessels.  As is well known, he granted passports to foreign owners on the 
grounds that these vessels would be crewed by Maltese and thus, in his opinion, 
would fall within the spirit of international law.  Abusive practices grew up under 
which Maltese passports were sold or transferred to those not entitled to them.  
Ball’s controversial passport policy thus caused some embarrassment to the 
British government.  Coleridge was to issue an Avviso of 25th June 1805 
cancelling all passports so as to nullify all those that had fallen into foreign 
hands.  Henceforth passports would only be issued in accordance with 
international law and ministerial instructions. 
 The cost of reconstruction would place considerable burdens on the public 
purse. The question was: would the British taxpayer inevitably assume the 
financial burden contrary to the wishes of British ministers?  
 
British Policy on Malta 
Ball understood that if B
would, government polici
rule.  Without the approval of the local population the island could not easily be 
maintained as a stable, strategic military base.18 It had impressed him that the 
French had lost the Island following a popular insurrection, albeit not without 
critical help from British and other forces.   
 Ball’s long term policy, designed to win popularity with the inhabitants, was 
to continue the operation of all the institutions of the government of the Order 
____
15  Evidence that the depression was over by April 1805 can be found at Ball to Camden, 19th April 1805, Public Record 
Office, Kew, CO 158/10/ 131-2. 
16  Ball to Cooke, 21st July 1805, Public Record Office, Kew CO 158/10/181. 
17 The Friend 1818 above n.  2, p.  567. 
18 Pirotta, G.  A,.  above n.6, p.14.   
85 Coleridge’s Malta 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
be resolved once the war ended.  Ministers naturally wished to 
plied by 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
of St John.  He proposed to his political superiors in London that the 
constitutional, political, legal and administrative order of the ancien regime of the 
Order of St John should be continued.  In his view, Britain should not seek to 
pursue reforms either in the administration or the Maltese constitution.19  In 
particular, the policies and institutions of the Order should be continued with 
only minor changes.  The rationale of this policy was to preserve the structure of 
Maltese political and economic life so as to avoid the Maltese being required to 
make a sudden adjustment to an unfamiliar legal, political, administrative or 
social structure.   
 The policy was also consonant with the possibility that the Island’s ultimate 
future would only 
avoid fundamental change in the institutions of government in case British 
possession proved to be one enjoyed merely for the duration of hostilities.  Ball’s 
continuation strategy was also consistent with lessons the British had learned 
from the somewhat difficult experiences in other colonies during the later part of 
the eighteenth century, as well as with general principles of the British 
constitution.  Most significant was the principle that in ceded or conquered 
territories, such as Malta, the laws of the territory in question continue in force 
until altered by the Crown.20  Ball’s plan appeared to be a coherent, rational and 
constitutionally appropriate policy.  British ministers in Whitehall ratified it and 
established it as the guiding principle of government after 1801.21  In fact the 
Instructions issued to Ball at the commencement of his second administration in 
1802 went further than this: Ball was to secure the attachment of the Maltese to 
British rule, which Ball interpreted as an injunction that the Maltese should 
benefit from British government.22  
 However, ministerial approval for Ball’s polices had been based upon a 
memorandum containing a statement of the finances of the Island, sup
Ball to Dundas at the end of 1800.23  For reasons that are unclear, Ball made a 
hasty assessment that the revenues of the Island would meet the expenses of civil 
government.  This meant, of course, that there would be no burden on the 
British taxpayer and made the possibility of retaining the Island as a British 
possession (a policy to which he was firmly committed) much more attractive to 
policy makers in London. 
 Ball’s statement hardened into a political expectation: the civil government 
____
19 Ball wrote in 1807 that: “It has consequently been my uniform system to abstain from every kind of change except in 
case of absolute necessity.” In part this was so because when the British took possession of the Island it was stipulated 
that the privileges of the Maltese be preserved and their ancient laws continued: see Ball to Windham, 28th February 
1807, Public Record Office, Kew CO 158/13/45. 
20  Campbell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowp 204. 
21  As the Royal Instructions dated 14th May 1801 issued to Cameron, Ball’s successor at the close of the latter’s first 
administration, instructions of make clear: Hardman pp350 et seq.   They are a vindication of Ball’s position.  
However, the political support for this plan rests somewhat shakily on the information which Ball had supplied to 
London in his Report of 1800: Ball to Dundas, 26th December 1800, Public Record Office, above , n.8. 
22  Public Record Office, Kew, FO 49/3/51-60. 
23  Ibid. 
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was required to ensure that that Island’s finances were not in deficit.24 
 One of the obvious difficulties that Ball ought to have understood was that, 
in adopting the continuation strategy, the British were assuming substantial 
financial and political burdens, not least for the hospitals, the payment of alms, 
the Università and the expense of the reconstruction of the Island’s battle 
damaged or otherwise neglected infrastructure.  Above all, the Administration 
had to bear the cost of maintaining the grain subsidy.  Maltese expectations had 
been raised that their old way of life would continue, and this was an expectation 
that it would be dangerous to frustrate.  Ball had, it seems, unwittingly 
manoeuvred himself into incommensurate political obligations: on the one had 
he had to satisfy ministers by balancing the budget; on the other, he had 
encouraged high expectations amongst the Maltese, and might risk insurrection 
if he could not deliver.25  The pressing question was how the continuation 
polices of government were to be funded, given the loss of much of the Island’s 
revenue after 1792.    
 Thus important questions arise from Ball’s political agenda.  The principal 
of these goes to competence.  Did the continuity strategy, and by extension the 
financial strategy, in its conception and in its execution conform to standards of 
good government? 
 In what follows it will be argued that notwithstanding its superficial merit of 
assured stability the continuation policy was fractured by structural weaknesses 
both in its conception and implementation.  Many of these difficulties derived 
from an inappropriate and poorly managed staffing policy, the rather elusive and 
problematic state of Island’s finances, as well as from ill-advised or poorly 
executed implementation strategies.  Financial and administrative accountability 
from the departments of government either to the Civil Commissioner or the 
Public Secretary appears, for example, to have been problematic.  Important 
archive material, which reveals something of the expected role of the Public 
Secretary, also suggests the limited extent to which Coleridge fulfilled that 
expectation.  This not only reveals something of Coleridge’s success as an 
administrator, but it also exposes an important lacuna that lay within the heart of 
government in 1805. 
 
The Importance of  the Università  
Since his first administration Ball seems to have decided the continuation 
strategy was sustainable if the grain monopoly produced a surplus.  From as early 
as late 1800 he appears to have believed that the grain monopoly exercised 
through the Università could achieve a surplus.  He had erroneously convinced 
____
24  The assumption that this was possible derives from Ball’s Report to Dundas of December 1800, above n.8.  This 
translated into a political expectation as Hobart’s Instructions to Cameron dated 14th May 1801 make clear: see 
Hardman above n.  4 at p.  355.  Ball, whose reputation was clearly at issue, was eager to assure ministers that a 
balanced budget could be achieved: see e.g.  Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/10/ 125. 
25  Thornton above n. 11 speculated that Ball may have been misled as to the financial state of the Island under the 
Knights of St John. 
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Lord Hobart that this had been so in the final years of the Order of St John.26  
This deeply rooted misconception, which might have been further fuelled by a 
report from Macaulay to Cameron in July 1802 that the Università had achieved 
a surplus of £50,000 (500,000 scudi), 27  placed the continuation strategy 
jeopardy unless the British taxpayer would shoulder the burden.   
 The supposed opportunity for profit presented by the Università was 
central to Ball’s financial planning.  Accordingly, we should expect Ball and his 
Public Secretary to supervise and monitor the Università’s operations.  It was, 
after all, a bulwark policy on which the funding of the public and charitable 
institutions largely depended and with it the social and economic prosperity of 
the Maltese.  The obligation to super
Instructions to Cameron in May 1801. 
 The surplus from the Università was paid into the Public Treasury and 
ought to have been the subject of reports to the Civil Commissioner.  Financial 
and other reporting would be a key component of this monitoring.  Of course, 
Coleridge did not accept the post of Treasurer, so this represents an important 
vacuum within the administrative structures.  The first question, is whether a 
suitable set of mechanisms, or a suitable process of scrutiny and accountability 
has been created and maintained in relation to this key institution? F
the rules for its operation clearly and coherently articulated? 
 As we have described, the Jurats had an operational responsibility for the 
running of the Università, but this was overseen by the Public Secretary.  
Although he had declined to act as Treasurer he could not side-step the 
supervision of the Università the accounts of which the Public Secretary was 
obliged to audit.  This would have engaged him in assessing the economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness of spending within the Università.  The guiding 
purposes of the audit would have been to ensure proper supervision of the 
Jurats, and to ensure financial probity, rigour and efficiency.  Coleridge thus 
found himself with 
go
  
Financial Accountability of  the Università 
There is incontrovertible evidence that Ball determined, for reasons now 
unclear, to keep the Università’s work at arm’s length.  He expressly forbad the 
Jurats to involve him in approving operational matters, and there is strong 
evidence that the supervision of the operational management of the Università 
was, at best, very light touch.  He instead directed them to use their initiative to 
realise the broad policy goals (principally the provision of cheap, abundant 
food). This letter, as Thornton observed in 1816, gave the Jurats authority for 
everything that could be done in their
____
26  Ball to Dundas Public Record Office, Kew, December 1800 CO 158/1/3 and see Hobart’s instructions to Cameron, 
Ball’s successor, dated 14th May 1801, Hardman, above n.4, p.354. 
27  CO 158/3/88-89. 
28  Thornton id.  CO 163/33/9. 
Coleridge’s Malta 88 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
ting to the 
al control imposed by the Public 
ent that the British 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
ormer Jurat, one Baron 
f the Commissario di Sanità, Dr 
pardi  
169, 171. 
 
33
34 den, 4th August 1804, Public Record Office, Kew CO 158/9/42-3. 
generating a surplus was not mentioned. 
 The structural failing in accountability that resulted from the letter is easily 
understood.  It reveals a failure to articulate clear and coherent rules under which 
the Jurats should operate, as well as weaknesses in the chain of reporting and of 
supervision.  The Jurats were given carte blanche to fix the purchase price 
(relative to the quality of the product), and to buy as much or as little as they 
chose, but government was permitted to set the retail price.  The international 
shortage of grain meant that either course would have been difficult for them.  
But Macaulay’s letter reveals that Ball did not intervene to direct the Jurats as to 
the amount that they should pay for grain in order to achieve the desired surplus.  
Nor did he make explicit in this letter the wider policy goals rela
surplus that they should have pursued.   
 However, this is not to say that that there were no checks on the Jurats.  The 
monthly accounts were audited and signed off as “approved and verified” by 
senior Maltese officials in the Università.29  This was, however, only an internal 
audit: Maitland made the alarming suggestion that the Università’s accounts 
might not have been externally audited.30  If so was Ball content to rely on 
internal scrutiny?  Was there any further financi
Secretary’s office under Coleridge?  
 Financial reporting by the Jurats to the Civil Commissioner, in so far as it 
took place revealed significant problems for the British administrators.  The first 
of these was that Ball was made aware as early as January 1804 that the 
accounting system had not met appropriate public law standards.31  Macaulay 
revealed that routine scrutiny by British officials, notably the Public Secretary, 
was not taking place.32  This lax arrangement meant that the responsibility for 
the audit and inspection of the accounts had been delegated.  Moreover, the 
Public Secretary had not seen and verified them.  It may have been for that 
reason that Ball seems not to have included them in the Island’s accounts of 
1804-5.  However, Camden requested the Università’s accounts in a despatch of 
23rd May 1804 when the funding by the British Treasury of the corn buying 
mission was being considered.33  Ball, in a reply dated August 4th 1804,   that was 
written in Coleridge’s hand, assured Camden that he had requested the 
Università’s accounts to be made up for the latest period.34  It was these that 
Macaulay delivered on 10th September 1804.  In other words, the detailed and 
more professional report may only have been prepared in response to a 
ministerial demand arising from the “final” investm
__
29  See NLM LBR 827/5.  Monthly accounts at this time (1804-5) were approved either by a f
__________
Savero Gauci, acting alone or, in some months, with the additional signature o
Azu
30  Maitland to Bathurst 13th October 1814, Public Record Office Kew, CO158/25/
31  Macaulay to Ball, 25th January 1804, Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/8/111.
32  Id. 
  Camden to Ball , 23rd May 1804 Public Record Office, Kew CO 159/3/122. 
  Ball to Cam
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umably, a lack of 
of accounts which requires exclusive and undivided attention.” 37  
 conclusion finds some support in 
lanced.39  Why was this not 
35  The capital required having been supplied by the Treasury in London, Camden wanted assurances that no further 
demands would be made on British funds.  The submission of the Università’s accounts was intended to give that 
assurance. 
Government was prepared to make in the Università.35  
 The impression is ever present that close financial scrutiny was lacking.  In 
February 1805 Ball claimed that since he had had control of the corn monopoly 
he had delivered a surplus of between fifteen to twenty thousand pounds on it 
even though wheat had been supplied at cheaper rates than in either Sicily or 
Italy.36  This was stated as a historical fact, not as a forecast of what he expected 
from the Black Sea corn mission. Thus here too, it is possible to identify the 
problems caused by the absence of a Treasurer and, pres
(reliable) information from the Jurats. 
 In a devastating admission, Ball eventually conceded that the scrutiny of 
accounts was not taking place.  He requested the appointment of an auditor and 
comptroller-general because the workload involved in supervising the 
government departments was too great either for him (or the Public Secretary) 
to bear.  He continued: “(t)he superintendence, indeed, of the public 
departments more immediately devolves on the joint office of the Public 
Secretary and Treasurer; but the various duties attached that situation must necessarily 
prevent the investigation 
(emphasis supplied)  
 This systemic weakness must explain why the financial information upon 
which Ball relied was misleading and unreliable.  Ball’s administration lacked an 
effective system of independent scrutiny.  This
the Royal Commission’s Report in 1812.   
 In respect of the Università the Commissioners reported that they found a 
“probable” large accumulation of debt by the Università.38  The examples of 
negligence that Thornton was later to describe cannot have been difficult to 
overlook if inspections had taken place.  For example, the books were left 
unclosed when they did not balance; there were “false entries” in the ledger 
made to give the appearance that the books ba
discovered and rectified much earlier than 1816? 
 Surviving records also suggest that Coleridge does not appear to have 
fulfilled all of the many responsibilities of the Public Secretary’s role, and one 
important lacuna created by this appears to have concerned the Università.   Ball 
was adamant that he was too pressed to devote close attention to the work of the 
Università40 and had expressly objected to doing so.  The likely conclusion, given 
Coleridge’s apparent lack of engagement with this institution, may be that the 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
36  See Ball to Cooke, 3rd February 1805 Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/10/23.  He still expressed the belief that 
the Order of St John had, in its final two decades, made an annual surplus of £10,000 on the grain monopoly.   
Coleridge repeated this in The Friend above n.2. 
37  Ball to Cooke, 30th November 1807, Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/13/465, and also Ball to Shee 12th May 
1807, , Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/13/463, CO 158/13/ 315-6. 
38 Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/19/172-173, 182. 
39  Thornton above n.11., Public Record Office, Kew CO 163/33/9-10. 
40  This reluctance to engage in, what he described as the detail of administration, extended to all departments of 
government, including the inspection of accounts: see Ball to Cooke 30th November 1807 CO 158/13/463. 
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supervision was largely delegated because Coleridge was not receiving reports 
from the Università and there is a complete absence of “ordine” (written 
instructions) issued in his name.41  This reveals that he was not directing either its 
operations nor, indeed, those of other government institutions.  This work also 
seems largely to have been delegated.  Coleridge’s lack of engagement and Ball’s 
decision to distance himself from close supervision of the Università’s work 
suggests that the Jurats were not held accountable by the m
o
British officials to believe 
 
Ball’s Financial Strategy 
Ball’s financia
e
government
 
(i) Taxation 
Cameron’s proclamation of 15th July 1801,42 caused confusion as to whether it 
had unwittingly created for the Maltese a constitutional right in relation to 
taxation, namely a commitment not to impose new taxes.  To aggravate matters, 
Ball had also discovered that every Grandmaster, at the time of his election, had 
been required to swear an oath not to levy new taxes, and this commitment had 
binding constitutional status.43  The unforeseen possibility was that (at the very 
least) the Proclamation of 1801 had inadverten
taxes would not be imposed or worse still, had created a constitutional limitation 
on the power to tax.44 
 Ball at first attempted to avoid the unpopularity and politically dangerous 
expedient of imposing new taxation.  By 1805 he was forced into a volte face.  By 
this time it was evident that the Island’s financial deficit could not be addressed 
by other means.  Moreover, there was a further expensive political issue that he 
had to address.  A major grievance nurtured by the Maltese arose from their 
exclusion from the negotiations for the French surrender.  They understood that 
the French had offered hostages as a security to ensure that the sums taken from 
the Università and elsewhere would b
which remain obscure, failed to make any provision for this restitution in the 
surrender articles.   
 This regrettable omission resulted in financial misery for a number of 
Maltese who lived off the interest paid on the capital once deposited in the Bank 
of the Università and for whom the economic bedrock of their lives had been 
destroyed.  Those Maltese who suffered significant hardship naturally blamed 
____
41  See National Archive Malta LIBR A22 PS01/2. 
42  Hardman, above n.4 at p.  358.  This constitutionally important Proclamation addressed to the Maltese Nation (“Alla 
Nazione Maltese”). 
43  Ball to Camden, 19th April 1804, Public Record Office, Kew CO 158/10/ 128, 130-131. 
44  Discussed by the Royal Commission in 1812: Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/19/151-154. 
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disclose less than complete confidence in the 
niversità’s ability to generate sufficient revenue. 
ry pending 
hapman’s return. 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
the British administration for the negligence of the British military. Funds would 
have to be raised so as to allow Ball to make (capped) interest payments to those 
affected.45  Coleridge, as Public Secretary, drafted the bando imposing the duty 
on wines and spirits that implemented this new policy.  Not the least of its most 
interesting characteristics is that it goes considerable lengths to win the argument 
that the tax was necessary and desirable.  Within the very instrument that makes 
the new law, Coleridge was forced to make a political and moral case justifying its 
introduction. In fact Coleridge’s argument was misleading since it suggested that 
the tax revenue was required for additional spending on deserving causes rather 
than (as was the case) largely necessary to underpin existing expenditure without 
burdening the British taxpayer.46 The readiness to use taxation to supplement 
the Island’s revenue may 
U
 
(ii) Income generation 
It was clear that a deficit (however large) could not be removed without the 
radical intervention of government.  By 1805, when Ball had realised that he 
could not avoid the imposition of some new taxation, he nevertheless continued 
to assert that the grain monopoly operated by the Università could provide the 
major source of the Island’s revenue.  Ball badly needed to produce a profit on 
the grain monopoly to defray the expenses of the institutions and policies of 
government.  He therefore proposed a speculative mission to buy corn from the 
Black Sea region.  Edmund Chapman was dispatched on this task and for this 
reason was not available to succeed Macaulay on the latter’s death in 1805.  This 
was the reason why Coleridge held the post as Acting Public Secreta
C
 
The corn mission of 1804-5  
Ball predicted a clear profit of £20,000 on the corn venture, which he appears to 
have regarded as one of low-risk carrying a high probability of vindicating his 
forecasts.47  He was confident that this would succeed and that “in a short time” 
the income to the Treasury would cover the civil expenditure.48  No further 
funds to support the Università would be forthcoming from the British 
____
45  Ball also reduced the Bank’s liability in other respects.  On 20th March 1805 the interest on the loans made under the 
Public Notice of 7th March 1804 were declared to have ceased and the capital deposited held at the disposal of the 
lenders until withdrawn.  It seems that not all deposits were withdrawn and so a large sum of about 400, 000 scudi 
(£40,000) remained in the University without paying interest on it.  This sum remained unpaid to the depositors until 
1809.  See Thornton above n.  11 at p.  26 
46  Bando 8th March 1805, National Library of Malta, MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814  f.2. 
47  See Ball to Camden Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/9/47 16th September 1804 in which he sent the accounts of 
1803-4.   He subsequently went so far as to state that the needs of the Island for its ‘immediate defence’ could then 
also be met from its revenues.  He contemplated a permanent garrison of 4,000 troops and later re-stated his estimate 
that a £20,000 surplus would be generated.  See Ball to Camden 19th April 1805, Public Record Office, Kew CO 
158/10/134. 
48  Public Record Office, Kew CO 158/10/125 and CO 158/10/135 He asserted that the deficit would be liquidated by 
the end of next year, i.e.  by the end of the financial year 1805-6.  His optimism was not vindicated as the failed 
mission incurred significant losses. 
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 to succeed in the manner that 
as forced by his political opponents to become 
hard wheat which was more liable to decompose when shipped.52 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Treasury; thus the venture was politically required
Ball had unwisely predicted that it would.49  
 However, the corn mission was poorly executed: the maladministration of 
officials meant that instead of the healthy surplus, the administration incurred 
further losses, which aggravated the Island’s financial position.  It also caused 
grave political embarrassment since questions of judgment and competence 
were inevitably posed.  Ball w
defensive about his policies.50 
 The débacle was one for which the Jurats were blamed, largely because the 
large volume of grain that was shipped to Malta appeared too rapidly in harbour 
to be accommodated.  The grain stores were inadequate to receive the 
consignments: some granaries were actually being used as barracks because a 
large contingent of troops under General Sir James Craig had arrived on the 
Island;51 other granaries were already full when the consignments arrived, and so 
of necessity, the wheat remained too long on board ships, as a result of which it 
decayed.  But that was not all because the wheat Chapman purchased was soft 
rather than 
 The Jurats were forced to release the wheat onto the open market, and the 
oversupply of poor quality grain meant that the market prices it fetched were 
much less than anticipated.  The administration’s reputation for competence 
suffered as a result of political disquiet about the poor quality of bread made 
from the bad wheat.  The evident failure damaged its credibility and added to the 
financial problems of the Università (and thus of the Island), as Ball was forced 
to admit.53  
 It is the aftermath of Chapman’s corn mission that is most revealing.  
Perhaps relying on reports from the Jurats, Ball claimed that Chapman’s 
consignment had actually generated a surplus, but somewhat less than he had 
expected.54 Livingstone, one of the Jurats, concluded in 1807: “… there has 
accrued to Government a considerable profit upon the whole transaction…”55  
This corroborated a report that Ball had earlier made to his superiors that the 
“saving to Government” was at least £21,957, probably more.56   Thornton 
described the costly failure as “by far the greatest loss that [the Università] had 
____
49 Public Record Office, Kew CO 159/3/121-122 Camden to Ball 24th February 1804 and Ball to Camden 19th April, CO 
158/10/ 1365 where he stated that by the close of “next year” the deficit would “nearly” be liquidated. 
50  Public Record Office, Kew, Ball to Windham CO 158/13/9 et seq., 28th February 1807.  This represents Ball’s 
defence to a number of accusations levelled by his critics against his “character and administration” including, his 
competence in the corn speculation and its aftermath. 
51  Ball to Windham 28th February 1807, Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/13/ 59. 
52  Ibid., CO 158/13/9 esp.  80. 
53  Although Ball steadfastly maintained that, taken as a whole, the consignment produced a saving to government: 
Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/13/58-59; CO 158/13/80; CO 158/13/206. 
54  Ball to Shee 12th My 1807 CO 158/13/314, Public Record Office Kew, CO 158/13/ 315. 
55  Livingstone to Ball 25th February 1807,  Public Record Office, Kew, CO 158/13/206. 
56  The careful emphasis on the “saving to Government” is revealing because Ball was not explicitly stating that there was 
a surplus; he is simply inferring  that the Government would have had to spend more had they bought grain 
elsewhere.  Ball to Cooke, Public Record Office, Kew CO 158/11/9 et seq..  Ball sent with this dispatch a statement of 
the costs and expenses of the Black Sea corn mission, not a revenue statement. 
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difference between the claims made by Ball and the facts identified by 
ii) Efficiency Savings 
nsitivity to taxation in 1805 can be seen in Coleridge’s very 
ued, but with mixed results.  In his 
ut the machinery of 
 it is believed 
________________________________________________________________ 
58 rplus of approximately 26,000 scudi had accrued to the Università in the financial year 1804-1805: Thornton, Id. 
then, or since, sustained.” 57  His investigation into the Università revealed a loss 
in excess of 805,000 scudi (£80, 500 approx.) for the financial year 1805-1806.58  
 The 
Thornton is stark.  One possible explanation for this may lie in an attempt by the 
Jurats—whom Ball blamed and subsequently dismissed—to cover up the true 
extent of their failure in a vain attempt to keep their jobs.  But an alternative 
possibility that cannot be entirely discounted would suggest that Ball connived in 
a significant misreporting.   
 
(i
Evidence of Ball’s se
first bando, (Proclamation) of 29th January 1805 which is of particular interest 
here because it reveals Ball’s hesitation even in cases where taxation was both 
constitutionally familiar to the Maltese and economically necessary.  The bando 
in question concerns the repair of roads and, in particular, the regulation of cart 
wheels.  The purpose of the instrument was to safeguard the road surfaces.  By 
avoiding damage in the first place, the Administration would minimise the need 
for costly repairs.    
 Other economies were also purs
Memorandum to Dundas of December 1800 Ball had noted that the expense of 
the hospitals was one of the greatest burdens of the civil government.  This 
admission was followed by the bold assertion that this cost could be “halved” as 
there were many (unspecified) “abuses”.  Ball was subsequently able to assure his 
superiors that he had reformed the hospitals in 1804, although he admitted that 
the costs had risen in that financial year, as a result of providing a salary incentive 
for management.  He was also careful to emphasise that costs had declined 
sharply in 1805 as the reforms took effect.59  
 However financial accountability was poor.  Having p
reform in place, it seems likely that Ball failed to follow up put in place a 
monitoring system.  Neither, it seems, did Coleridge in his capacity as Public 
Secretary.  The Royal Commission of 1812 reported that the hospitals had 
become over-manned: twice as many staff had been employed as were needed to 
serve its needs and this appeared to be long standing problem. 
 Although many of the important records have not survived,60
that the extant financial and other information furnishes some evidence that 
there were systemic problems about which Coleridge ought to have been aware 
____________________________
57  Thornton above n.11 at p.  16. 
 A su 
59  See Macaulay to Ball, 10th September 1804 CO 158/9/51, 55-6 Ball admitted that the salary of the three Presidents 
had been increased so as to ensure his leadership in providing good management, and drew attention to “considerable 
reforms” which seem to have involved the merger of the Invalids and Foundlings Hospital. 
60  In the 1870’s it seems that a large part of the papers of the Public Secretary’s office were deliberately destroyed to 
create  space at the Chief Secretary’s office for more recent records: Despatch to Secretary of State 412 19th 
December 1936: see the Catalogue of Records of the Public Secretary and Treasurer 1800-1813, Joseph A Caruana, 
National Malta Archives, Introduction. 
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onclusion
idge was unexpectedly appointed to the pro tempore office of Public 
is role required him to support 
n, albeit one favourable to Coleridge, is that the role of 
lame 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
and which, as Acting Public Secretary, he might have been expected to address.  
His uncritical acceptance of Ball’s policies is also of interest, particularly as his 
loyalty in this respect went beyond an appropriate expression of collective 
ministerial responsibility for government policy.  A more scholarly objectivity in 
his subsequent accounts of the Island is lacking, in particular in those accounts in 
The Friend, which were first published after Ball’s death in 1809.61 
 
C  
When Coler
secretary he found himself burdened with a range of responsibilities including 
the oversight of the departments of government and semi-autonomous 
institutions that were critical to the success of the British administration.  In his 
notebooks he ventured numerous complaints about being over burdened by the 
extensive demands of his appointment.  But his difficulties may have been more 
complex than merely being overloaded.    
 In Coleridge’s defence it can be argued that h
and implement the polices of the Civil Commissioner many of which were 
flawed either in conception or implementation.  Coleridge was not responsible 
for the authorship of these polices, but there is evidence that, in so far as they 
were poorly executed, Coleridge does share a responsibility.  For example, the 
hospitals were over-manned, the Jurats were to an unacceptable degree 
unsupervised, there were no proper controls on authorising expenditure and 
lines of accountability were obfuscated.  Most telling is Ball’s admission that the 
accounts were not properly inspected.  This conflicts with Coleridge’s evidence 
that he was involved in auditing the Departments, but the impression that this 
function was not thoroughly and professionally discharged is impossible to 
dispel. 62   
 A possible explanatio
Public Secretary was simply too multi-faceted requiring specialist administrative 
and professional skills.  Ball’s assessment of the facts following the merger of the 
roles of Public Secretary and Treasurer seems to bear this out.  It indicates that 
when so combined, the duties could not properly be discharged by one office 
holder, and it is significant that he sought a professionally qualified individual to 
oversee the accounts.  Moreover, the eclectic range of responsibilities of Public 
secretary is sufficient in itself to justify the conclusion that the Office was 
beyond the abilities of one individual.  Perhaps no officeholder could have 
managed effectively the tasks properly assigned to the Office, much less an 
untrained poet in uncertain health.   
 A further benign possibility that absolves Coleridge of some of the b
for the structural failings of the administration, is one that requires further 
research.  It suggests that Coleridge, as a temporary stand-in was “by-passed” by 
Maltese administrators; in other words that some at least of the functions of the 
____
61  Above n.2, most notably pp.  527-580. 
62  See n 29 above.  
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office were assumed by others, most notably the Proseggretario, Guiseppe 
Zammit.  It is unclear whether Coleridge was aware of this, or agreed to it.  What 
is apparent is that Coleridge, unlike other Public Secretaries, did not direct the 
affairs of the government departments by issuing “ordine”, for there are none 
recorded in his name.  To that extent scholars need to re-assess earlier 
assumptions that Coleridge performed the tasks of a professional administrator 
appointed to the office of Public Secretary: there is clear evidence that he did not 
perform the role to the same extent as officeholders.  This not only illuminates 
his achievement in office in 1805, but also raises further questions about the 
effectiveness of the under-skilled British administration under Sir Alexander 
Ball. 
